kernel.org compromised

Read it yourself…
  1. ———- Forwarded message ———-
  2. From: J.H.
  3. Date: 2011/8/29
  4. Subject: [kernel.org users] [KORG] Master back-end break-in
  5. To: users@kernel.org
  6. —–BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE—–
  7. Hash: SHA1
  8. Afternoon Everyone,
  9. As you can guess from the subject line, I’ve not had what many would
  10. consider a “good” day.  Earlier today discovered a trojan existing on
  11. HPA’s personal colo machine, as well as hera.  Upon some investigation
  12. there are a couple of kernel.org boxes, specifically hera and odin1,
  13. with potential pre-cursors on demeter2, zeus1 and zeus2, that have been
  14. hit by this.
  15. As it stands right now, HPA is working on cleaning his box, and
  16. I’m working on hera (odin1 and zeus1 are out of rotation still for other
  17. reasons), mainly so that if one of us finds something of interest, we
  18. can deal with it and compare notes on the other box.
  19. Points of interest:
  20. – – Break-in seems to have initially occurred no later than August 12th
  21. – – Files belonging to ssh (openssh, openssh-server and openssh-clients)
  22. were modified and running live.  These have been uninstalled and
  23. removed, all processes were killed and known good copies were
  24. reinstalled.  That said all users may wish to consider taking this
  25. opportunity to change their passwords and update ssh keys (particularly
  26. if you had an ssh private key on hera).  This seems to have occurred on
  27. or around August 19th.
  28. – – A trojan startup file was added to rc3.d
  29. – – User interactions were logged, as well as some exploit code.  We have
  30. retained this for now.
  31. – – Trojan initially discovered due to the Xnest /dev/mem error message
  32. w/o Xnest installed; have been seen on other systems.  It is unclear if
  33. systems that exhibit this message are susceptible, compromised or not.
  34. If you see this, and you don’t have Xnest installed, please investigate.
  35. – – It *appears* that 3.1-rc2 might have blocked the exploit injector, we
  36. don’t know if this is intentional or a side affect of another bugfix or
  37. change.
  38. – – System is being verified from backups, signatures, etc.  As of right
  39. now things look correct, however we may take the system down soon to do
  40. a full reinstall and for more invasive checking.
  41. – – As a precaution a number of packages have been removed from the
  42. system, if something was removed that you were using please let us know
  43. so we can put it back.
  44. – – At this time we do not know the vector that was used to get into the
  45. systems, but the attackers had gained root access level privileges.
  46. That’s what we know right now, some of the recent instabilities may have
  47. been caused by these intrusions, and we are looking into everything.
  48. If you are on the box, keep an eye out, and if you see something please
  49. let us know immediately.
  50. Beyond that, verify your git trees and make sure things are correct.
  51. – – John ‘Warthog9’ Hawley
  52. Chief Kernel.org Administrator
  53. —–BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE—–
  54. Version: GnuPG v1.4.11 (GNU/Linux)
  55. Comment: Using GnuPG with Fedora – http://enigmail.mozdev.org/
  56. iEYEARECAAYFAk5a5U0ACgkQ/E3kyWU9dif+1ACfYPlgq/keFrFO77AmQVduKGwx
  57. TAcAnRAu6nHt74+5aC+fPeb8aT0hcy2K
  58. =Semd
  59. —–END PGP SIGNATURE—–

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